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Jump down to document The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. The Commission poses a key question regarding China's re-emergence as a maritime power: do recent People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activities reflect a China that will act as a responsible stakeholder, or a China that will seek to only pursue its own national interests? My testimony hopefully will provide insight into the PLAN as a rapidly modernizing maritime force, whose fleet over the next decade will be structured, equipped and trained for a diversified mission portfolio supporting China's expanding economic interests. Whether or not this will equate beyond 2020 to the construction of a force capable of global sea power projection will largely depend upon the perception of China's leaders regarding the viability of economic lifelines under existing maritime security conditions. In the next three to five years, Chinese Communist Party elites probably will make the decisions determining the direction of naval power projection for the next two to three decades. 1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
Even if China's leaders assess that energy and market access is basically secure, and deem naval power projection beyond China's peripheral seas unnecessary, the PLA will continue to modernize for a number of diverse tasks-some of which are of great concern to U.S. policy makers. The PLAN is modernizing to support joint warfare in the littoral, conduct sea control operations in near peripheral waters and sea denial operations at extended ranges in regional seas, and deploy and sustain naval formations in support of non-combat or low-intensity operations in distant seas. This latter capability can support mutually desirable stakeholder objectives, such as international law enforcement, peace-keeping and humanitarian relief operations.
Communist Party Guidelines for PRC Naval Modernization and Operations
The PLAN has operated for decades under an "offshore active defense" strategy, but only since former President Jiang Zimen's promulgation of active defense guidelines in 1993 did this have real meaning for naval modernization. Under Jiang's "Military Guidelines for the New Period," prioritization of capabilities to conduct sea denial operations beyond Taiwan accompanied the need to protect coastal economic centers of gravity and deter or delay U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict. As part of the requirement to win a "local war under high-technology conditions," Jiang's "strategic guidelines of the active defense" also led the PLAN to develop offensive capabilities to conduct limited sea control operations to enforce sovereignty and territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. 4 This requirement has changed slightly over the intervening years, to fighting and winning a "local war under informatized conditions"-recognizing the criticality in modern warfare of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and network electronic warfare.
More recently, China's leadership has openly stated that the PRC is a central player in the world economy, and that global stability and prosperity are intertwined with Chinese national development. The overarching approach to this national development is expressed in President Hu Jintao's "Scientific Outlook on Development," which encompasses an evaluation of China's internal and external security environment and highlights the centrality of global economic factors. The vulnerability stressed in the White Paper has been echoed in a number of other sources in the form of what Hu Jintao has labeled "the two incompatibilities." The first "incompatibility" is represented by the gap between the current level of PLA capabilities and the aspiration to win a "local war under informatized conditions." The second is the lack of military capabilities to defend expanding national interests. 8 The PLA is explicitly instructed to defend China's broader interests, which implicitly demands that the PLA conduct threat assessments and capabilities development in the context of economic lifelines and activities. This will be an area of much debate for Party leaders and PLA strategists over the coming months.
In order to correct the deficiencies noted in the "two incompatibilities," the White Paper describes a framework for the armed forces to enhance capabilities to accomplish "diversified military Supporting a Diversifying Mission Set: Platforms, Weapons and Bases. 13 The maritime capabilities that China has developed over the past two decades, primarily focused on operations against Taiwan and U.S. forces responding to a Taiwan contingency, are applicable to broader mission sets and will form a foundation for future programs. There will, however, be a number of To improve the deterrent impact of Beijing's nuclear counter-strike strategy, the PLAN is also modernizing the sea-based nuclear force. A new SSBN, the Type 094 class, has entered service.
Analysts expect it to be armed with 12 ballistic missiles, which could have a range of as much as 12,000km. This would permit attacks on most continental U.S. targets from protected locations close to China's shore, and new basing facilities will allow deployments from both the northern and southern coasts of China. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the PLAN has increasingly focused on naval diplomacy and exercises with regional partners and major maritime powers. 16 In Chinese economic interests will require the capability to conduct sea control and air superiority operations along sea lanes in the Philippine Sea, Straits of Malacca, and Indian Ocean. China's leaders will be making decisions in the near term regarding military and non-military approaches to perceived vulnerabilities in these areas. 19 Given national development priorities, it is unlikely China will pursue the extremely high cost of transition to a carrier navy for at least the next ten to fifteen years. More likely is a "hybrid" navy that has one or two carrier groups designed to provide force projection for regional contingencies or a show of presence in distant sea lanes. Reports indicate that the Russian SU-33 ship-based fighter may be the airframe of choice for an indigenous conventional propulsion carrier in the 45,000-60,000 ton range, and that construction could begin at any time at Shanghai's Changxin Island shipyard. 20 An operational carrier will lend prestige to China's Navy, and provide extended airpower in scenarios where China can protect the carrier, such as in a South China Sea crisis. It could, of course, also be used to support humanitarian and disaster relief missions. To focus on forming carrier groups for global power projection, however, would be an enterprise of immense cost, and one that would potentially heighten regional and global fears of Chinese adventurism. For many regional contingencies, the anti-access capabilities that Beijing currently prioritizes offer more return for the investment, and some of these capabilities might be sacrificed if China pursues broader power projection goals centered on carriers. Increasing Chinese access to bases along key sea lanes might be viewed as a much lower cost option for purposes of limited force projection and deterrence of attacks to Chinese shipping.
Strategic Implications for the United States
U.S strategists and analysts should thoroughly assess at least three broad categories of mission sets for which Chinese leaders have directed the PLAN to prepare: Convincing Beijing that current SLOC security and freedom of navigation operations provide a secure environment for Chinese shipping may help to channel resources away from large-scale power projection programs. Understanding China's stance regarding territorial and resource claims in the East and South China Seas, however, is essential for keeping resource allocations in perspective-programs to militarily enforce these claims may accrue from decisions to forego more global capabilities, and could be every bit as harmful to U.S. interests. Security analysts often focus to our own detriment on broader power projection issues, mirror-imaging that potential competitors seek to develop symmetric capabilities with the U.S. Alleviating Chinese concerns regarding energy and resource vulnerabilities includes both global SLOC security considerations, and diplomatic resolution of regional claims.
Countering Anti-Access Strategies. Chinese anti-access strategies and capabilities are formidable. The threats to U.S. freedom of movement and action in Asia include conventional, long-range strike threats to U.S bases and maritime formations, and counter-C4ISR threats to U.S. forces' "eyes and ears." These threats would be significantly exacerbated in a scenario in which the U.S is denied full use of regional bases. Washington's options for regional contingency response will diminish if China can successfully convey to regional actors that long-term political, economic, and security costs of full support to the U.S. are too high to bear.
U.S. and Japanese submarine forces should figure prominently in counter-measures for PLA antiaccess capabilities on China's eastern or southern periphery. For Taiwan and beyond, the U.S.
needs an anti-submarine warfare architecture with distributed sensors, unmanned vehicles, and the full complement of surface, sub-surface, and aerial detection, targeting, and weapons systems. Maintaining a larger number of our own nuclear attack submarines in the Pacific (including SSGN missile boats) would also provide a number of advantages that would complicate the Chinese use-of-force decision calculus. As the PLA develops deep-water mining capabilities, new mine counter-measure systems also will be increasingly important. As China fields a more effective stand-off capability via improved detection, tracking and long-range missile systems, U.S. carrier groups may have to operate further from China's coast to avoid unacceptable risk. Ensuring air superiority over potential trouble spots in the East and South China Seas (particularly the Taiwan Strait) will involve difficult decisions about the extent to which the U.S. is willing to strike key targets on the Chinese mainland.
Reinforcing the Regional Security Structure. PLAN littoral and green water power projection capabilities will certainly weigh ever more heavily on regional actors as they determine security alignment policies and force development priorities. U.S. military-to-military contacts in South and Southeast Asia are a critical component of the regional security architecture-one that must not slip as China grows in influence. The importance of physical presence of naval forces in the Pacific also must not be underestimated, and naval exercises should openly illustrate rapid surge capabilities. Even the perception on the part of Beijing that PLA capabilities could deny U.S.
freedom of action would at best complicate peaceful resolution of issues, and at worst lead to miscalculation and escalation.
As I noted in testimony before this Commission in 2006, China's leaders appear to believe that diminishing U.S. influence and access in Asia must eventually occur to accommodate China's reemergence as a great power. I delineated, and still recommend, a policy approach to cooperative security and market mechanisms to alter this thinking. The primary focus should be on maintaining the physical military presence in Asia that sends a clear message of commitment to the region, while addressing Chinese desires regarding evolving, inclusive regional security architectures. Washington should ensure overtly recognized U.S. supremacy in key capabilities, but must not rely on this dominance as sufficient to ensure regional stability in the longer term.
U.S. leadership in regional security arrangements, along with a cooperative, market-based approach to oil and natural resource access, potentially can channel PRC military capacity toward shared security roles and interests, and away from a decision to build increasingly formidable maritime power projection capabilities.
